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Abstract. In this article, rationales for the widespread existence of commercial real estate
leasing are examined. Given the tendency of tenants to abuse property to their own
advantage, there must be powerful incentives on the other side to encourage landlords
and property managers to participate in the widespread practice of leasing. We suggest
that common leasing practices are the consequence of many rationales, including the
ability of the landlord to solve free-rider problems in maintaining property desirability
and informational asymmetries that exist between landlords and tenants.
A lessor’s natural response to tenants’ tendency to abuse or overuse rental property
(see Henderson and Ioannides, 1983; Miceli, 1989; and Kanemoto, 1990; and
Benjamin, de la Torre and Musumeci, 1995) is to raise the rent. If would-be tenants
can buy property, however, the result may be failure of the leasing market (Benjamin
et al. 1995). Yet since World War II we have witnessed a virtual explosion in the
prevalence of commercial real estate leasing.1 This prevalence suggests that some
market imperfections cause both landlords and tenants to gain signiﬁcant value (i.e.,
more than enough to offset the losses due to asset abuse) from a lease rather than an
outright sale.
This article examines a number of potential rationales for leasing rather than owning
commercial property and suggests that the primary factors in favor of leasing are the
abilities of landlords and property managers to eliminate free-rider problems, to
exploit economies of scale, and to specialize in valuation, maintenance and disposal
of commercial property. Given the abilities of landlords and property managers in
these areas, tenants are willing to pay higher lease rates in return for additional
expertise, service and reduction of risk. In addition, landlords and property managers
can use their knowledge to enhance their performance as intermediaries. Not only can
they provide better service if they know speciﬁcally what qualities have caused lessees
to lease rather than buy (and create efﬁciencies to deliver more and better service),
they will also be better prepared for any problems that are likely to arise (e.g., those
resulting from lessee’s credit risk).
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In the ﬁrst section, we describe the asset abuse problem and its implications for the
decision to lease or buy. The second section lists and brieﬂy describes some of the
possible reasons for the existence of commercial real estate leasing in the presence
of these abuse problems. The third section discusses in detail one of these reasons,
the consequences of an informational advantage of the lessor. The ﬁnal section is the
conclusion.
The Asset-Abuse Problem
A number of articles (see Lewellen, Long and McConnell, 1976; Miller and Upton,
1976; and Myers, Dill and Bautista, 1976) have used an argument similar to
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) capital-structure irrelevance proposition to suggest that
property users will be indifferent to leasing or purchasing the property. One common
assumption of these models is analogous to ﬁxed investment, namely that the tenant
would make the same choices with the property that the owner would. Just as violation
of the ﬁxed investment assumption in the Modigliani and Miller framework leads to
agency problems, so does allowing the tenant to choose behaviors suggest the
existence of an analogous asset abuse problem.2
Consider a commercial property owner who is choosing among three uses for a
property. We shall order the possible uses so that each generates larger operating cash
ﬂows than the previously speciﬁed one, but also leaves a reduced property value. The
ﬁrst use generates net operating cashﬂows of $50,000 and leaves the property with a
$300,000 value at the end of the period. The second generates net operating cashﬂows
of $80,000 and leaves the property with a $280,000 value at the end of the period.
Finally, the third generates net operating cashﬂows of $100,000 and leaves the
property with a $240,000 value at the end of the period. Without loss of generality
and assuming that the effect of time value of money is negligible, the owner ﬁnds the
second use to be best: its $360,000 total value is higher than the $350,000 of the ﬁrst
project or the $340,000 of the third one.
Tenants, however, earn only net operating cashﬂows from their businesses and do not
have a stake in the value of the property at the end of the period. Thus, if the owner
rents a property to a tenant who has the same three uses from which to choose, the
tenant will not have the same incentives and in general will not make the same choice.
In our example, instead of choosing the second project, he will ﬁnd the third one
most attractive since it generates the largest cashﬂow. This misalignment of incentives
is referred to as the asset abuse problem (i.e., the tenant’s property use or abuse
incentives differ from the landlord’s).
Benjamin, de la Torre and Musumeci (1995) suggest several possible solutions to the
problem. The most obvious, that the lessor charges a lease rate sufﬁciently high to
compensate for the loss of salvage value, will lead to market failure. The lessor,
wanting to net the same $360,000 as if the second use was chosen but expecting the
tenant to choose the third, could charge $120,000 rent so the net beneﬁts would be
$360,000 (5 $120,000 rent plus $240,000 residual property value). The lessee,
however, ﬁnding none of the uses sufﬁciently attractive to merit a $120,000 leaseRATIONALES FOR REAL ESTATE LEASING VERSUS OWNING 225
payment, will choose not to lease, and the market for leasing will dry up. Although
there exist some mechanisms to avoid these incentive problems (e.g., rents tied to the
level of abuse), the measurement of variables needed to implement these mechanisms
may be problematic. Thus, the question remains as to why lease markets have
ﬂourished to the extent that they have.3
Rationales for the Existence of Leasing Markets
There are a number of possible rationales for the existence of leased property, even
in the presence of asset abuse problems. These rationales include:
n Taxes;
n Differential access to credit markets;
n Transactions costs;
n Risk shifting;
n Comparative advantage in asset disposal;
n Asymmetric information;
n Economies of scale; and
n Other agency problems.
Taxes
Perhaps the most common reason cited for the existence of leasing markets is avoiding
or reducing taxes (see Lewellen, Long and McConnell, 1976; Myers, Dill and Bautista,
1976; Brealey and Young, 1980; Lewis and Schallheim, 1992; Barclay and Smith,
1995; and Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995). For example, Myers et al. ﬁnd that different
tax rates for the lessor and lessee are an important reason for the existence of leasing.
They argue, ‘‘saving taxes seems to be the only motive that is both obvious and
substantial.’’4 Lewellen et al. also ﬁnd taxes to be an important consideration, but
conclude that the preference for leasing versus owning could go either way, depending
on speciﬁc tax conditions. Sharpe and Nguyen also ﬁnd tax considerations to be a
signiﬁcant motivation in the lease-purchase decision, with ﬁrms subject to a lower tax
rate being more inclined to lease.
Prior academic research has focused primarily on the economics of capital leases,
while many real estate leases are operating leases. Although taxes might be a factor
in any leasing decision, Smith and Wakeman (1985) point out that there are other
non-tax rationales or determinants for leasing. Since the tax arguments are well
analyzed, we focus on these other factors.
Differential Access to Credit Markets
A second possible reason property users lease rather than buy the property they use
arises from differential access to credit markets. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), for
example, ﬁnd that ﬁrms subject to high capital costs engage in signiﬁcantly more
leasing (of all types) than other ﬁrms. For consumer leasing, the existence of rent-to-
buy plans (typically at higher rates than an ordinary purchase on credit) is also an226 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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indication of limited access to credit.5 As Smith and Wakeman (1985) and Barclay
and Smith (1995) point out, in the event of default it is generally easier for a lessor
to reacquire a leased asset6 than for even a secured creditor to acquire the pledged
asset.7 While this may be an important consideration for commercial real estate, it is
probably more germane for other types of assets, if for no other reason than that,
unlike other assets, real estate is immobile and readily identiﬁable. In addition, the
fact that large retailing chains (such as Wal-Mart and Sears), many with greater access
to capital markets than their lessors, choose to lease rather than buy their store space
indicates that some other factors are at play.8
On the other hand, if lessees generally lack access to capital because of credit risk,
then property managers’ optimal behavior will most likely assess and incorporate this
risk into the lease terms. Perhaps lessors or property managers assess those credit
risks, possibly pegging lease rates (or other lease terms) to them.
Transactions Costs
A third rationale proposed in the literature develops from transactions costs. Flath
(1980), for example, discusses a number of components of transactions costs,
generally in the context of short-term operating leases. One such cost is that of
transferring title to the asset. The fact that many large commercial lessors (e.g.,
supermarkets and industrial space users) intend to stay at the leased site indeﬁnitely
suggests this cost may not be a signiﬁcant factor in commercial leasing. On the other
hand, real estate, like any other asset, is always most valuable when it is put to its
best use. In a relatively stable environment, such best use is likely to remain constant
over time. When the environment is subject to constant changes and shocks, however,
the best use will likely also change. An example cited by Brueggeman, Fisher and
Porter (1990) is the transformation into retail space of warehouses along Baltimore’s
waterfront and the transfer of ‘‘back-ofﬁce’’ operations of Sears, Citicorp and other
large ﬁrms from costly urban center buildings to less expensive suburban locations.
Since professional developers are more likely to be alert to such possibilities and to
know exactly which users might ﬁnd the property more valuable, the function of
ﬁnding such users in a rapidly changing environment has been transferred to them.
Likewise, these same developers are also more likely to ﬁnd suitable tenants for the
vacated properties in a manner that minimizes search costs. These search costs are
often classiﬁed as a type of transactions cost and are an important reason for the
current predominance of leasing over ownership.9 Other costs Flath classiﬁes as types
of transactions costs may also be relevant to long-term leases of commercial property
and are included in the subsequent discussion.
Risk Shifting
Risk shifting has also been cited as a potential reason for commercial leasing. Miller
and Upton (1976) use a CAPM framework to show the irrelevance of the lease/
purchase decision. However, as Flath (1980) points out, use of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) assumes that the risk characteristics are exogenous and are
not affected by the existence of the lease. A lessee, like a buyer, is purchasing use ofRATIONALES FOR REAL ESTATE LEASING VERSUS OWNING 227
property, but the owner/buyer is subject to the risk of deterioration of value,10 while
the lessee has the option of not renewing the lease if the desirability of the property
declines. This type of risk shifting may be relevant because the lessor of a strip mall
or shopping center may be in a better position to control such risk. Further, when
informational asymmetries exist,11 as they likely do in commercial property markets,
the CAPM assumption of homogenous beliefs is inappropriate.
Comparative Advantage in Asset Disposal
The existence of comparative advantage in asset disposal, a ﬁfth rationale, has been
suggested by Lewellen, Long and McConnell (1976), who cite several reasons for
such a comparative advantage. The main reason, one that is applicable to commercial
real estate, is the reduction in search and information costs. On the other hand, what
may to an uninformed investor seem to be a comparative advantage in asset disposal,
may in reality indicate that the property is more valuable than the uninformed investor
realizes; that is, the lessor may own, in general, a more valuable property due to his
informational advantage employed at the time of purchase and development.
Asymmetric Information
A comparative advantage in asset disposal is one of many potential rationales for
leasing that results from asymmetric information. There are at least two different forms
of asymmetry that might lead to such an advantage. The ﬁrst is a knowing the identity
of potential future users of the property. This minimizes the costs of searching for
tenants who could put the property to its best use. A second type of informational
asymmetry regards the future value of the property. In the next section, we present a
model that suggests that this informational asymmetry helps explain the prevalence
of leasing. In addition, asymmetric information has a number of other implications.
In a sense, since such asymmetric information can generally be equalized at some
cost by the informationally disadvantaged party, it can be viewed as a type of
transactions cost.12 Indeed, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) suggest, ‘‘informational
asymmetries are the most basic form of transactions costs.’’ For example, if lessors
have developed an expertise in knowing which areas will continue to thrive and which
will deteriorate (due to such factors as zoning, crime patterns, etc.), then the fact that
a property is offered for lease rather than sale brings with it a type of certiﬁcation,
namely, that the (presumably better informed) lessor thinks highly enough of the
property’s potential that he wishes to keep it. Although on the surface it seems that
a lessee can equalize the informational asymmetry by insisting on an option to buy,13
the fact that the lessor would offer such an option (while presumably charging a higher
rent to compensate himself for what the lessee perceives to be the fair value of the
option) signals similar implications about the lessor’s perception about the future value
of the property.14
The property user could, of course, eliminate this asymmetry by incurring the expense
of becoming as knowledgeable as the commercial lessor, but this is exactly the sort
of ‘‘transactions cost’’ to which Bhattacharya and Thakor refer. Since real estate is
not the main focus of a property user’s business and because such an expense of time228 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 1
Economies of Scale in Apartment Ownership and Management
Change 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990–95
Total Units Managed (%) 6.2 0.9 7.0 1.9 6.0 4.4
Total Units with Ownership (%) 0.2 0.1 21.8 9.4 2.3 2.0
Top Five Units Managed (%) 26.4 10.8 9.7 12.4 18.5 8.7
Top Five Units with Ownership (%) 6.3 5.8 1.6 16.7 8.8 7.7
Top Ten Units Managed (%) 21.8 2.8 7.6 7.2 14.9 6.0
Top Ten Units with Ownership (%) 0.7 3.0 1.7 14.3 5.4 4.9
Top Twenty Units Managed (%) 3.1 0.6 8.2 2.7 10.6 5.0
Top Twenty Units With Ownership (%) 21.2 1.3 0.3 11.3 4.6 3.2
Bottom Ten Units Managed (%) 11.1 1.7 4.6 21.5 20.1 3.1
Bottom Ten Units with Ownership (%) 9.1 24.8 26.1 4.0 5.7 20.4
Note: Data from the National Multi-Family Housing Council for the 50 largest apartment owners
and managers. Data not available for 1990.
and money is a distraction from the main line of business, outsourcing becomes a
cheaper way to handle the problem.15
Economies of Scale
We believe economies of scale exist in the owning and management of commercial
real estate properties that would, in a competitive market, translate into lower lease
rates for tenants. As the number of real estate properties or units increases (via
acquisition, consolidation or development), so would the economies of scale due to
the ﬁxed-cost nature of many ownership and management expenses. If the leasing
market is competitive, these reduced average ownership and management expenses
would, ceteris paribus, be passed on to tenants in the form of lower lease rates. If
economies of scale in operating commercial real estate do exist, then the largest
companies that own or manage real estate should be growing fastest due to their
competitive position.16 Exhibit 1 summarizes National Multifamily Housing Council
data representing the ﬁfty largest of each of apartment owners and managers. The
data do indeed suggest that the largest of these companies are expanding at a faster
rate than the smaller ones. For example, while the number of units owned by the
entire ﬁfty largest apartment owners has increased at a rate of 2.0% between 1990
and 1995, the top ﬁve have increased by 7.7% and the top ten by 4.9% during the
same period. In contrast, the smallest ten (of the top ﬁfty) have experienced negative
growth, an average of 20.4% during the ﬁve-year period. Similar results hold for the
ﬁfty largest management companies. For example, while the number of units managed
by the entire 50 largest apartment managers grew at a rate of 4.4% between 1990 and
1995, the top ﬁve grew by 8.7% and the top ten by 5.0%. On the other hand, the
smallest ten have grown by an average of only 3.1% during the ﬁve-year period.
Further, excluding 1991 (when the real estate recession was greatest) results in even
more pronounced differences between the largest and smallest of the set. While someRATIONALES FOR REAL ESTATE LEASING VERSUS OWNING 229
of these effects may be due to a type of survivorship bias, it seems likely that
economies of scale account for some of the differences.
Other Agency Problems
Finally, the prevalence of malls and strip shopping centers suggests that leasing is a
solution to another problem, namely a free-rider problem. Property values are
determined in large part by trafﬁc patterns, crime and the general desirability of the
neighborhood. Since these characteristics are inﬂuenced primarily by zoning laws, law
enforcement and the types of businesses in nearby locations, a concerted effort by
contiguous property owners to lobby for or ensure favorable conditions for the area
would be desirable. If, for example, owners in an area engage in no lobbying, hire
no private security monitoring or make no general attempts to maintain the area’s
appearance or desirability, all the owners will be worse off by, say, $10,000 each. On
the other hand, suppose that if each of the local businesses donates two hours and
$50 per month to such activities, property values would remain at their current level.
Under ordinary wage and time value of money conditions, it is clear that such behavior
makes each property owner better off. Yet, such activities might not be undertaken
because their beneﬁts would accrue not just to owners making the expenditures, but
to owners of adjacent properties as well. Thus, any individual owner has little incentive
to make such expenditures: if the neighbors are doing it, individual actions will be
unnecessary, while if they are not, the efforts will be insufﬁcient. The businesses might
attempt to form an equivalent of a homeowner’s association, but it is difﬁcult to
enforce the collection of dues or to control dropouts.17 Although the application of
the Coase (1960) Theorem illustrates that socially optimal cooperation occurs in the
absence of market imperfections, Coase (1988) points out that the imperfections
themselves often make simplistic economic models inapplicable in practice.
In this context, market imperfections take the form of the costs of getting other owners
to contribute. In other words, there is a free-rider problem, with each owner earning
virtually no marginal return on expenditure. When one lessor owns much of the
property in one area, such a problem is solved because the lessor is a main beneﬁciary
of maintaining the value of the neighborhood and because such maintenance depends
largely the lessor. The lessor either makes the expenditure and earns the beneﬁts or
does not; there is no free-rider problem. Given that it is optimal to make the
appropriate expenditures to maximize property value, the expense of such activity can
be passed on to tenants as higher lease payments. Thus he serves as the equivalent
of a ‘‘homeowner’s association’’ with the power to collect ‘‘dues.’’
The advantages of centralizing the responsibility for lobbying, security and
maintaining an attractive appearance has an analogy in the banking literature. James
(1987) ﬁnds that the stock market reacts positively to announcements of a ﬁrm’s
commercial bank loans but shows no response to public debt. Since the lender in the
ﬁrst case is a single entity exposed to all the risk of default, there is a greater incentive
to investigate and monitor the ﬁrm than there is in the second case, where the risk is
split up among many bondholders. Thus the bank, in assuming the entire risk of a230 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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loan, certiﬁes that the loan is likely to be repaid, just as the lessor, in assuming the
entire risk of a neighborhood decline, centralizes the incentive to thwart such a
decline.
The Consequences of Informational Asymmetry
Early ﬁnancial models assumed equal access to all information and found that capital
structure and dividend policy were irrelevant to ﬁrm valuation. Because such results
were not realistic to practitioners, the assumption of identical information was a
natural one for academics to relax. More recently, models of asymmetric information
have been used to explain not only capital structure and dividend policy decisions,
but also the existence of such intermediaries as investment bankers and banks. In
many cases, these intermediaries offer certiﬁcation of creditworthiness or a reduction
in some type of transaction cost for their clients.
Williamson (1988) argues that leasing exists in part arising from efﬁciencies in
transacting (i.e., in certain situations a lease provides the least costly alternative). Flath
(1980), along with Smith and Wakeman (1985), detail several non-tax expositions for
leasing, including the degree of asset specialization as well as the extent to which the
lessor holds an advantage in asset disposal. Because most equipment is leased for a
term less than its economic life, part of the value of the asset is derived from its
resale or liquidation. If property is too specialized, then the residual uses of the
property will be limited. It can be argued that the more specialized a real estate
property, the less likely the existence of highly developed secondary markets.18 To
compensate for the non-liquidity in the secondary market, landlords could demand
higher lease payments; but doing this in turn would diminish the initial cost advantage
associated with leasing the asset, mitigating the selection of very specialized assets
in lease contracts.
It follows that with the development of secondary markets for the residual real estate
assets, landlords would have a better understanding of the values range for the leased
assets simply because the lessor would accumulate, if only by trial and error, a
comparably larger set of information about the leased assets than would other market
participants.19 Further, it appears that a lessor holding a diversiﬁed portfolio of real
property assets would have many more transactions than the tenant.20
Even if developers and less informed investors have the same estimate of the average
future property value and the correlation between property value and the stock market,
traditional asset pricing models may lead developers with better information to place
a higher value on commercial property. For example, suppose that the CAPM holds
and that both developers and potential users of the property believe its expected value
to be $2 million. Suppose also that, based on past data, both parties believe the
correlation between the growth rate of property value and the stock market to be .5.
Moreover, both parties observe a riskless rate of 5% and expect the market return to
be 15% and to have a standard deviation of 20%. Suppose, however, that the property
user believes the standard deviation of the capital appreciation rate on the property to
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believes it to be only 30%. In this case, the property user will estimate a beta21 of
b 5 .5(.50)/.20 5 1.25, while the developer will estimate a beta of b 5 .5(.30)/.20 5
.75. Accordingly, the property user will require a return of E(R) 5 .05 1 1.25[.15 2
.05] 5 17.5%, while the developer will require a return of only E(R) 5 .05 1
.75[.15 2 .05] 5 12.5%.
Thus, the user will value the property at only $2,000,000/1.175 5 $1,702,128, while
the developer will value it at $2,000,000/1.125 5 $1,777,778. (For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we ignore any operating cash ﬂow the property may
generate over the course of the year.) This effect is exacerbated if the number of
periods is large. For example, if both parties believe the property will, on average, be
worth $5 million in ten years, the user will value it at $5,000,000/1.17510 5 $996,762,
while the developer will value it at $5,000,000/1.12510 5 $1,539,731. Similar results
hold for more general pricing models (e.g., Arbitrage Pricing Theory). The results
presented here are also roughly analogous to models with a mean-preserving spread,
suggested by MacMinn (1989).
Many economic models allow uninformed investors to become informed by observing
market prices and the behavior of informed investors. For example, Kihlstrom and
Mirman (1975) ﬁnd that, in a single period, uninformed investors can infer the
information they lack when there is a one-to-one correspondence between market
prices and the useful component of the missing observation. Moreover, even in the
absence of such correspondence, an uninformed investor can infer the equilibrium
value of an asset if a series of transactions can be observed over time. In this latter
case, the price will converge to the equilibrium price even though the observer never
learns the actual information that determines values.
A paradox arises in an economy such as that proposed by Kihlstrom and Mirman,
since it suggests that the returns to undertaking analysis of an asset’s value are
insigniﬁcant. If there are no returns to such analysis, security analysts will serve no
purpose and will cease their activities; but if security analysts are not present to
identify underpriced and overpriced securities, there will be positive gains to such
opportunistic analysis. One response to this dilemma has been to assume the existence
of noise (or liquidity) traders, i.e., traders who engage in transactions for reasons
having little to do with their estimation of the values of these assets (e.g., Glosten
and Milgrom, 1985). Such noisy trading makes inferences about underlying
information substantially more difﬁcult to draw.
Drawing such inferences is probably even more difﬁcult in commercial real estate,
since the market for leases has characteristics different from those of the security-
market models suggested earlier. For one thing, market prices are not always available
for all commercial property. Since the Kihlstrom and Mirman result depends on a
regular sequence of transactions, convergence to the ‘‘correct’’ price will be very slow
when transactions of a speciﬁed asset take place not daily, but only once every several
years. The shortage of empirical work on leasing issues is another indication of the
difﬁculty in obtaining data. A related problem is the fact that commercial property is
not fungible. For proximate property that seems identical in all other respects,232 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 3, 1998
knowledge of the exact path of a planned expressway may have different implications
for future values.22 On the other hand, in noise-trading models the identities of the
parties are unknown, while in a real-estate framework, the identities of the buyers and
sellers (and, very likely, something about their motivations) are typically known, a
difference that suggests the noise-trading models may not be appropriate in a
commercial real estate setting.
A more serious problem, however, is the potential for market failure. Consider a real
estate market that has a variety of properties with intrinsic values ranging from $1
million to $5 million, and suppose that this range is known to all investors. These
intrinsic values depend not only on the current cash ﬂows these properties can
generate, but also on future cash ﬂows. These future cash ﬂows will, in turn, depend
on whether the neighborhood appreciates or depreciates in value.23 Suppose that
informed investors (which we may assume to mean developers) are much less
uncertain about the future of the neighborhood; without loss of generality, we may
assume they know the exact property value.
A problem arises when an informed investor wishes to sell a property to an
uninformed investor. Since the uninformed investor only observes the range of values,
the investor will not be willing to pay more than the average value.24 If the prices are
uniformly distributed between $1 million and $5 million, this means the investor will
be willing to pay only $3 million (5 [$1,000,000 1 $5,000,000]/2).
Since the developer knows the intrinsic value of the property, the only developers
who will be willing to sell under such conditions are those who know their property
is in the lower end of the range of values, namely, between one million dollars and
three million dollars; those who know their property is worth more will choose to
lease rather than sell. Once the set of properties offered for sale is restricted in such
a fashion, however, the mean drops to $2 million (5 [$1,000,000 1 $3,000,000]/2).
Once potential buyers revise their offers, half the sellers will once again drop out of
the market. This process continues, until the only properties offered for sale are those
worth only $1 million.
The market presented is an application of Akerlof’s (1970) market-for-lemons
principle. When the seller of an asset has better information about the value of an
asset than does the buyer, it is difﬁcult to avoid market failure. Other models reach
the same conclusion. For example, Cornell and Roll (1981) assume there are multiple
classes of participants in the market with different comparative advantages at
production. They show in a game theory context that when an individual is matched
with another who is more productive, the less productive individual will ﬁnd failure
to compete to be a stable strategy.25
In the present context, the developer has a comparative advantage at estimating the
future desirability, and hence the future value of the property. Therefore, the potential
buyer has a comparative disadvantage and will refuse to compete (i.e., will not buy
the property). However, if a leasing arrangement is available, the lessor can produce
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a rational alternative to purchase; in a way, leasing completes the market by allowing
uninformed investors to use property without suffering permanent disadvantage from
their lack of information.
Conclusion
Given the existence of tenant asset abuse or overuse in leasing commercial real estate,
this article examines rationales for the existence of leasing by focusing on cash ﬂow
concerns for both the landlord and the tenant. The landlord’s beneﬁts include not only
the lease payment and depreciation, but also the expected residual value of the leased
asset. The analysis shows that in maximizing the expected value of the cashﬂows for
a given investment, the landlord’s and tenant’s optimal level of property abuse will
not be the same. By entering into a lease contract, the tenant would stand to gain
because wealth can be appropriated from the landlord by over-utilizing and under-
maintaining the property.
Recognizing that lessees have little incentive to control their level of abuse, why does
leasing exist? A number of reasons have been proposed, including taxes, differential
access to credit markets, risk shifting, transactions costs, comparative advantage in
asset disposal, economies of scale, asymmetric information and other agency
problems. Knowing the reason for the existence of leasing is important to property
managers, since they can use this knowledge to enhance their property’s performance.
For example, if credit risk is the main force causing lessees to lease rather than
purchase, perhaps property managers and landlords should make efforts to assess this
risk and charge differential rental rates. Our analysis emphasizes the lessor’s: (1)
ability to exploit economies of scale in property management; (2) ability to solve free-
rider problems; and (3) greater understanding of the predicted residual asset values.
This last advantage suggests that accumulated information and expertise can provide
property managers with a residual value greater than the loss arising from the tenant’s
asset abuse. This analysis does not imply that better information on the part of the
lessor is the sole reason for leasing. Rather, the analysis qualiﬁes and extends Smith
and Wakeman’s (1985) assertions about the non-tax determinants for leasing so as to
beneﬁt property managers and owners.
Notes
1The International Council of Shopping Centers’statistics show that the square footage of leased
retail space exceeds the square footage of owner-occupied retail space. Further, recent U.S.
Census survey data shows that thirty-ﬁve million households rent homes or apartments.
2In the corporate ﬁnance arena, Brennan (1995) observes that over the last twenty-ﬁve years,
corporate ﬁnance has come to recognize that contracts fail to constrain future decisions of
contractual participants. This failure to constrain, with the resulting agency problems, has led
to a shift in the research focus of corporate ﬁnance from what behaviors lenders (landlords)
would allow to asking what roles decision-makers (tenants) are likely to follow, given their
incentives.
3Goldstein and Richards (1995) point out another deterrent to leasing, namely, ‘‘the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
which provides for strict liability for a current or past landlord’s business operations. If, for234 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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example, a landlord of a local storage operation happened to have a tenant who stored toxic
materials, unknown to the lessor, and if the toxic material leaked, thereby contaminating the
surrounding area, the landlord would be jointly liable for the cleanup. Unfortunately neither
ignorance nor due diligence is a legitimate defense against liability. Furthermore, past owners
may be liable if the contamination occurred during their ownership.’’
4Lease payments for tenants are considered tax-deductible expenses by the IRS. Barclay and
Smith (1995) comment that there exists great ﬂexibility in allocating depreciation tax shields
in a lease so that the lessee, lessor, or both can beneﬁt from the depreciation tax shield,
depending on which party values them more highly.
5The extreme example of this consumer phenomenon in reverse is the existence of pawnshops,
where the owner gives up use of an asset for a length of time in exchange for a high interest-
rate loan.
6Barclay and Smith (1995) note that leases generally have the highest priority (along with the
landlord’s right to repossess the leased asset) when bankruptcy occurs. However, courts have
restrained the landlord from repossessing the leased property or space when the tenant has
successfully argued that the asset is necessary to the ongoing operation of the business. The
authors note, however, that the courts require the tenant to continue making the required lease
payments until the end of the bankruptcy process. In contrast, other creditors (such as
debtholders) are not paid until the bankruptcy process is ﬁnished.
7For one thing, legal title remains with the lessor. Absent any protective municipal statutes,
recovery under a lease is generally an enforceable contract remedy that is much less expensive
than foreclosure on a mortgage. Nevertheless, a type of default can occur in leasing as well.
For example, in The Death of Common Sense, Philip Howard reports, ‘‘Recently, posters were
spotted on the Upper West Side in Manhattan seeking a creditworthy person to share an
apartment rent-free. The plan, detailed on the poster, was to sign a lease, move in, and then
refuse to pay rent. Under New York City procedures, the poster explained, a minimum of
eighteen months is required for the landlord to get an order of eviction. So, thanks to the costs
of process, you can live free and move on.’’
8Other less credit worthy businesses are unable to borrow funds because default risk premiums
are too high and thus they ﬁnd leasing their only access to credit.
9One empirical prediction of this conjecture is that ownership is more likely to be found where
property attributes are stable (e.g., rural areas) while leasing is more likely to be prevalent where
conditions are constantly changing (e.g., modern urban areas).
10The buyer can, of course, default if the property value falls below the mortgage balance, but
such a dramatic fall may not be likely if the business has much equity. Moreover, such a default
has considerable reputational effects that failing to renew a lease does not.
11In addition, the parties’ actions and therefore the distribution (and risk) of the cash ﬂows are
not likely to be invariant to ownership of the property (e.g., the asset abuse problem).
12This return on information, or transactions cost, is not unique to leasing. In many respects the
lessor’s return is analogous to a bid-asked spread associated with the stock markets. In this
case, the specialist or dealer takes the difference between what is paid for a security and the
price at which it will be sold. The transaction difference is warranted in part by the dealer or
specialist’s difﬁculty in obtaining good information, much like that of a developer/property
owner in a commercial real estate setting.
13In fact, under some conditions such options have been shown to reduce the asset abuse
problem (see Benjamin, de la Torre and Musumeci, 1995).
14Sale with an imbedded put option for the purchaser (i.e., an option for the purchaser to return
the property to the seller) would solve this problem. Such puts are implicit guarantees and have
been initiated in the new-car market, but such options in real estate are not yet widely used.RATIONALES FOR REAL ESTATE LEASING VERSUS OWNING 235
Another imbedded option already present in a lease is that of the tenant to simply pay the
remaining rent and walk away, but this is extreme and is presumably rarely used.
15Similarly, ﬁrms could, in theory, sell their own securities without using an investment banker,
but they rarely do so since the expenditure of time and effort is not worth the beneﬁt of
eliminating ﬂotation costs.
16There may, of course, be some diseconomy of scale as ﬁrms become ‘‘too big.’’If a signiﬁcant
diseconomy of scale exists, however, we would be less likely to ﬁnd larger ﬁrms growing faster
than smaller ones, as the subsequent data suggests.
17Cooperative associations do exist for business proprietors (e.g., downtown business
associations). However, these function primarily as a combined marketing tool that may or may
not permanently affect property value.
18The issue of specialization also affects the lessor’s obsolescence risk. At the inception of a
lease contract, a signiﬁcant level of uncertainty concerning the residual value of the asset and
the degree of obsolescence is inevitable. By retaining the residual claim on the asset, the lessor
assumes the obsolescence risk and provides a type of insurance function. According to Clark
(1989), lessees are willing to allow the lessor to charge a rental (insurance) premium for this
risk-taking because it lessens their risk associated with obsolescence. In aggregate, the lessor
receives from each lessee a rental payment which yields a sufﬁcient premium to compensate
the lessor for the potential lost value associated with the residual assets.
19A Business Week (May 1, 1989) article reported that Guiness Peat Aviation (GPA) completed
the largest plane leasing order in history—about $17 billion. GPA subsequently planned to
‘‘farm out’’ the planes through operating leases, charging top dollar in return for ﬁnancing the
planes and for assuming the risk of disposing the planes at the termination of the contract. In
addition to leasing planes to airlines, GPA has also provided lenders (banks and other
intermediaries) that deal directly with the airlines default insurance obligating GPA to buy a
plane should an airline default on its loan with a bank. The bank reduces its risk exposure while
GPA could expect an opportunity of reselling the repossessed plane at a proﬁt. All of this is
possible since GPA has arguably the best database (i.e., information on used aircraft values).
20Comdisco, Inc. is an international concern that specializes in marketing, among other things,
used computer equipment—especially mainframe conﬁgurations. Comdisco has leased new as
well as used computers. In their 1988 annual report, Comdisco reported that they ‘‘re-marketed’’
550 medium- to large-scale mainframes, 8,500 disk and tape drives, and 21,500 terminals
amounting to $259.9 million. In addition, Comdisco has initiated an aggressive leasing program
in the telecommunications area, which as of the end of ﬁscal 1988 totaled to $290 million. It
may be safe to say that given the volume of the leasing transactions, Comdisco has developed
a growing expertise in the asset portfolio they manage.
21b 5 sIM/(sm)2 5 rIMsIsM/(sm)2 5 rIMsI/sm, where rIM denotes the correlation between the
asset I and the market.
22Similarly, some cities (e.g., Washington, DC and Berkeley, CA) have high-crime areas adjacent
to low-crime areas, with very little leakage. Needless to say, purchasing property only a block
or two from that offered by the lessor could be disastrous under such conditions.
23Since the salvage value of the property at the end of the period depends on these future cash
ﬂows, models that focus on such values are special cases.
24If the investor is risk averse, the investor will not be willing to pay that much; we will, again
without loss of generality, assume the investor is risk-neutral, that is, will pay what is viewed
as the average value of the property.
25In that context, a stable strategy is one that survives evolutionary pressure (i.e., natural
selection). Thus, it is not assumed that the participants know the exact payoffs and calculate
the appropriate strategies, just that participants with inefﬁcient strategies will be ultimately236 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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driven from the market. A straightforward introduction to such evolutionary stable strategies
and to other aspects of game theory is presented in Strafﬁn (1993).
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